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themselves out? Friedman is not sure,
but he does give us a disturbing prospect
about which we need to think deeply.
SAM J. TANGREDI

The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation,
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region,
by Michael R. Auslin. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
Press, 2017. 304 pages. $30.

The signature foreign policy move,
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the
Asia-Pacific region. President Obama’s
initiative grew out of his conviction that
Asia had become the most important
region in terms of economic dynamism,
explosive demographic growth, and
growing military tensions. And if one
broadens the geography and semantics
to include India—yielding the “IndoPacific”—this makes utter sense, since
the region claims 60 percent of the
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of
total global economic output, some of
the fastest-growing and most capable
militaries, and three nuclear states. No
surprise, then, that the Obama White
House argued in a November 2015 fact
sheet that this region “is increasingly the
world’s political and economic center of
gravity.” Or, as top Asia expert and diplomat Kurt M. Campbell astutely wrote
in The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of
the history of the twenty-first century
will be written in Asia” (pp. 1, 344).
While the Obama administration
made a compelling case for the logic
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating
the time, attention, and resources
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given to the region relative to other
parts of the world—the results were
uneven. Washington reinvigorated its
diplomacy in the region, strengthened
commitments with U.S. treaty allies,
forged relationships with new partners
such as Burma, began shifting military
assets to the region, and negotiated
a far-reaching trade deal intended to
deepen economic integration. But it also
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered
significant political setbacks with treaty
allies Thailand and the Philippines,
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons
capable of reaching the United States,
and did little to restrain Chinese
maritime assertiveness and economic
and political coercion in the region.
How then should one understand and
evaluate the myriad factors contributing
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to
the continued growth and stability of
the region now eclipsing the region’s
promise? These are the questions that
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence
at the American Enterprise Institute,
asks in his judicious, sobering, and
compelling new book The End of the
Asian Century. Auslin argues that Asia’s
future is significantly less assured than
is commonly held. As a longtime scholar
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he
is positioned well to make such a case.
This book is far from a polemic; in
fact, Auslin approaches these questions
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact
originally held the opposite belief—that
the twenty-first century inevitably
looked to be an Asian century. Yet
through repeated trips to the region and
multiple meetings with senior policy
makers, businessmen, and military
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officers, he became convinced that risk
rather than opportunity was the most
salient feature of the Asian political,
economic, and military landscape. He
argues that U.S. policy makers have been
overly optimistic about opportunities in
the region and insufficiently attentive to
risks, thereby warping U.S. perception of
regional trends and causing the United
States to pursue misguided policies.
This book is Auslin’s attempt to introduce a framework to assess risks in Asia
properly, across five major categories.
These include threats to Asia’s growth
from the end of its economic miracle
and the failure to implement structural
macroeconomic reforms; demographic
pressures that will place increasing strain
on rapidly modernizing and urbanizing political and economic systems;
unfinished political revolutions that will
address these large-scale economic and
social dislocations; long-term historical
antagonism among various Asian states,
the lack of effective regional political
community among them, and the dearth
of effective institutions to mitigate crises;
and, most alarming, the growth of power
politics and the increasing potential for
war. The book’s organization follows
these categories, with chapters mapping
risk in each thematic domain. A final
chapter both summarizes and concludes
with a series of policy recommendations.
Auslin posits that as risk increases,
prudent investors take out more insurance. This advice is as relevant to nations
as to individual investors, and applies
across all the categories of risk contained
in the earlier sections of the book. In the
security realm, he argues for a concentric triangular approach, with an inner
core of states—Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Singapore—working
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closely with an outer core of the region’s
liberal-democratic heavyweights,
Australia, India, and Japan, to counter
an increasingly aggressive China.
Economically, he advocates for structural reforms within Asian nations and
trade liberalization among them. To
alleviate political instability, he pushes a
realistic democracy-promotion program.
To avoid isolating China, he promotes
an agenda for enhancing contact with
ordinary Chinese citizens. Linking all
these recommendations is a belief that
long-term stability in Asia is most likely
to flow from increased liberalization and
democratization, and that the United
States should have an indispensable
role as partner and catalyst in that
process. Absent American involvement,
investment, and leadership, short- and
long-term instability are likely to rise.
Auslin issues the caveat that his book is
not intended as a comprehensive guide
to all the countries in the region or all
the issues affecting them. And yet in just
222 pages his book manages to serve
not only as an excellent introduction
to the region but as an incisive guide to
understanding the contemporary risks
roiling the most consequential region of
the world. Extremely useful for national
security professionals, investors, and
interested observers alike, this book
moves beyond headline news to analysis
and advice in navigating the region’s
shifting geopolitical, demographic, and
economic landscape. Some will find
his recommendations too aggressive,
although his policy prescriptions explore
both costs and benefits. Others perhaps
will allege that Auslin is too bearish, too
gloomy on what many are expecting to
be the dawn of the Asian century. But,
given the acceleration of tensions in
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Asia, the demise of trade liberalization,
the erosion of democracy and advance
of autocratic rulers, and the doubts
the Trump administration has cast on
its commitment to alliances, we may
find that he was in fact too sanguine.
CHARLES EDEL

Warring Navies: India-Pakistan; Indian Navy’s
Role in the Indo-Pak Wars, by Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko. Dombivli West, India: Frontier India Technology, 2014. 320 pages. $20.

Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko’s book,
Warring Navies, is a welcome addition
to the scant coverage of the naval
history of South Asia. The authors are
a retired Indian navy commodore and
a defense journalist, respectively, and
the book draws heavily on Commodore
Rai’s experiences in the navy. The book
itself crosses the boundaries between
memoirs and popular history, covering
the history of the Indian navy’s operations from independence through the
end of the Cold War. It also includes
several stand-alone essays on various
topics related to maritime and regional
security by prominent retired Indian
military leaders, such as former army
chief Ved P. Malik, former navy chief
Vishnu Bhagwat, and Lieutenant
General C. Satish Nambiar. One of
the major strengths of the book is its
coverage of the many lesser-known uses
of the Indian navy (e.g., the liberation
of Goa in 1961 and the interventions
in the Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri
Lanka in the 1980s). It is particularly
useful for both Indian and non-Indian
readers to be aware of these past actions
today, as both India and its international
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partners debate India’s role as a security
provider in the Indian Ocean region.
The book is pitched toward a general
audience interested in military and
naval affairs in South Asia. The prose is
engaging and humorous, which makes
the book a quick read. For example,
the title for the chapter on the 1965
war—in which the Indian navy was not
particularly active—is “The Navy Does
Sweet Fanny Adams in 1965.” One of the
more interesting aspects of this book is
its use of various Indian, Pakistani, and
American autobiographies and memoirs
to interject vignettes from people
involved in the conflicts, ranging from
Indian naval officers to Pakistani leaders
and even to Henry Kissinger. These
provide insight into the perspectives of
participants in the events. The book’s
main strength is that it gives an insider’s
view on the challenges of joint operations for the Indian military. There are
some excellent examples, ranging from
air force and naval aviation in the 1965
war to amphibious operations in 1971
and smaller operations in the 1980s.
A couple of minor points detract from
the book. Given that it is a popular
history based on personal observations
and the memoirs of participants, some
of the general history of the conflicts
does reflect older interpretations and
narratives that are now debatable. The
book is not academically sourced and
does not have citations, so the reader is
left wondering whether the book would
have been improved if the authors had
engaged more with the work of recent
historians, such as Srinath Raghavan’s
excellent work on the 1971 war, or
even the classic histories of the Indian
navy done by Admirals Singh and
Hiranandani. Similarly, the book could
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